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1. JAPANESE LEFTISTS PLAN ANTI-US RALLY

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25X1	The Japan Socialist Party, in co-operation with the leading leftist organizations in Japan/plans a large-scale demonstration of 15 June to demand the abolition of the "unequal treaties" with the United States. Socialist sources have told the embassy that the Communist rank and file will probably participate in the demonstrations, which will be held on the eve of Prime Minister Kishi's departure for Washington. The timing of the rally is designed to put the Socialists in a position to attack Kishi on his return for the "failure" of his mission to realize popular aspirations.
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Comment Leftists in Japan have refrained from violence since the 1952 May Day incident, which caused a severe loss in popular support for the Communist Party. Lessening of the furor over the Girard case, which the rally originally intended to exploit, has eliminated some of the danger of violence, but the Communists reportedly intend to keep the issue alive by demanding severe punishment.

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			AGAINST SUMUAL	CIMBLI MMI	ODL	
05)/				X1A		
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			to bombing in an			
			Col. Sumual, ter	- :		
			in East Indonesia			
	L	tions with a	my chief of staff Genera			25X′
	25X1		•			
25X1		r	ecent changes within Sur	nual's comma	nd effected	
20/(1		by Nasution	had so far failed to solve	e the problem	since	
		Sumual state	d he will not leave his p	ost unless for	ced to do	
25X1		so.				
		Comment	Sumual has show	n no dispositio	on to sur⊸	
			render his comm	and, although	recent	
		talks in Mak	assar between Nasution	and East Indo	nesian	
		commanders	appear to be aimed at a	ichieving a pea	aceful	
		settlement.				
			Continued efforts			
			a bloodless coup in Eas			
			its command, can be a			
			e employed as a final al			
		and the navy	, both quite small, are l	loyal to the go	vernment.	
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4. WEST GERMAN OPINION INCREASINGLY FAVORS FIRST-STEP EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE

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The American embassy in Bonn reports that majority sentiment in West Germany is increasingly receptive to a European inspection zone as part of

a first-step disarmament agreement, despite Chancellor Adenauer's apparent resistance to this proposal. In his statements on the subject to date, Adenauer has indicated a fear that any approval by Bonn of an inspection zone including German territory would be viewed by West Germans in an election year as abandoning Bonn's pressure for progress on reunification.

Many influential West German politicians and newspapers--including some of the opposition--have recently stressed that even though such a first-stage agreement assumes the continuing partition of Germany, Bonn should do nothing to disturb the London negotiations, since the only road to reunification leads through a general detente and agreement on disarmament.

The embassy feels that public opinion in an election year may bring Adenauer to endorse a first-step agreement even if it is limited to Europe, while at the same time stressing its importance in creating a better atmosphere for reunification.

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5.	BRITISH STATEMENT	REGARDING	BRITISH	SHIPS
	TRADING WITH COMM	IUNIST CHINA	4	

	STATEMENT REGARDING BRITISH SHIPS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA	
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Royal Na stated the	A British Admiralty spokesman has declined specific comment on recent Chinese Nationalist warnings that British merchant ships trading with list China will be fired upon, but stated that the vy will "afford protection" to such ships. He at British ships can always call for protection igh seas."	at a e
ment with Navy con with Nati a system	Britain has used similar language to state its policy on numerous previous, but presumably still wishes to avoid involved the Nationalists on this issue. In the past, in manders have exercised great caution in contonalist units, and Britain has at no time main atic naval patrol in the Taiwan area. The Royal Navy now has two cruises stroyers, and three frigates in the Far East.	us e- Royal tacts tained
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c	CONTIT TO A	DISCUSSES	AMEDICAN	TALAT
b.	GOMULKA	DISCUSSES	AMERICAN	LUAN

Gomulka's speech of 5 June to Poznan workers of the Cegielski factory, where last year's riots started, reaffirms Poland's intention to follow a course designed to reap economic benefits from both

the East and West. He endorsed acceptance of an American loan, although he disabused those who expected miracles from Western economic aid. He assured the workers that the US credit of \$95,000,000 would be approved, but complained that it was too small and the interest rate higher than that charged by Communist nations. He emphasized, however, that the aid was important since it would not only help to alleviate Poland's present economic difficulties, but could pave the way to a relaxation of international tensions.

Gomulka promised Poland would continue to seek such aid from the West. While he is known to be suspicious of the West, he nonetheless probably sees Western ties as advantageous for his economy and a form of insurance against Soviet domination.

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8.	INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT	REPORTEDLY	FACES
	SERIOUS FINANCIAL CRISIS		

	SERIOUS F	FINANCIAL CRISIS	
25X1A	40 to 50 pe tion to the the disaffed the govern	An official of the Bank of Indexpressed serious concern to embassy officers over the efficiency of government export permits for Approximate the average. He attribute increase in barter arrangements and cted provinces. The bank official statement can come to terms with the provinceal situation will be "virtually here".	American fect of the rts on the of payments. il and May is ed the situa- smuggling in ted that unless inces without
	exports is engaged in over the is the product Djakarta, I particularl increasing ports, with	Indonesian national income is pendent on the export of a linural products, petroleum and tin. The produced in the non-Javanese province a bloodless revolution with the central sue of regional autonomy. Revenue of tion of foreign companies in Indonesia but agricultural produce in the hands by copra in East Indonesia and rubber ly being diverted into direct barter transfer the result that the central government and export charges.	nited variety he bulk of these les, currently hal government herived from h still goes to hof Indonesians- hin Sumatrais hade with foreign
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B .	ties aga	inst US fo	oc country in rces abroad in the immed	, US allies	or areas		
C.	Arab sta between Arab sta	ates is not the Arab ates thems	initiation of t probable. states and I selves, thes n the immed	Although to srael and a e are not li	ensions co imong cer	ntinue tain	25X1A
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